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Conference Panel Discussion
Internal Corporate Investigations*
Prof. Shipman: Art's paper is incisive and thorough, and suggests any number of
questions. First, I would like to turn to Stanley Schwartz, Jr. with the question of
whether to use inside counsel, outside counsel that regularly represents the company,
or outside counsel that is a special counsel with no connection with the company.
What are your views on the calculus? These are important issues, both from a
standpoint of expense and of putting the matter to rest.
Mr. Schwartz: Morgan has asked me to supplement Art Mathews' remarks from
my own perspective, that of an Ohio corporate lawyer, a non-specialist who has
participated in two internal investigations.
The first investigation occurred in a company which I had represented for a
relatively short period of time. There were material errors in this company's pub-
lished financial statements extending over a period of years, resulting in both the
expected litigation and an informal investigation by the Enforcement Division of the
Commission. The matter was further complicated by the fact that a former executive
had written a letter to the Enforcement Division accusing other members of manage-
ment of various misdeeds and cover-ups. We advised the board of directors that this
was a textbook case for immediate investigation by independent outside counsel
under the direction of the audit committee composed of independent directors. That
advice may be characterized as a "no brainer." Since we had previously represented
the company, it was clear that we should not participate in the investigation. The
report of independent counsel, approved by the audit committee, was accepted by the
Enforcement Division of the Commission. The press release that we attached to the
Form 8-K 1 served as an alternative to public dissemination of the report.
The second investigation was less public. As outside general counsel of a regular
client, I became concerned about certain questionable offshore practices of the client.
The situation involved possible violations of local law, rather than questionable
payments. My concern arose from the overly broad and overly zealous interpretations
of the United States wire fraud 2 and mail fraud3 statutes asserted by certain federal
prosecutors, which appeared to provide that violations of local law at any place in the
world constituted a violation of United States law.
For various reasons, the best solution was an internal investigation by counsel
under the audit committee of the board. In this case, I participated but insisted that
two other firms join me. One was completely new to and independent of the client,
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and the other was the client's special counsel in the type of law that was the subject
matter of the investigation. Counsel prepared a joint report which was adopted by the
audit committee and the board. Foreign counsel determined that the questionable
practices did not materially violate local law. To eliminate any question of liability in
the future, the board ordered the practices discontinued.
If I had to do it over again, I probably would have abstained from the process
completely and left it entirely to outside counsel. I would have taken this approach for
two reasons. First, as you know, a camel is a horse designed by committee. It is very
difficult for three lawyers to agree on anything, and the committee process itself is
cumbersome for an investigation. Secondly, and more importantly, it is very difficult
for lawyers to conduct investigations of their own clients. Personal relationships that
must be preserved in order to render legal advice efficiently over the years become
strained. Listening to the Southland story today reinforces the conviction I have
gained from my own experiences: in my opinion, lawyers should not undertake an
internal investigation of their own clients.
Let me put on my Ohio hat for a moment. Art spoke of the institutionalization of
the internal investigation. I thought I would take a look at Ohio law and see what has
been done in this state. Ohio General Corporation Law section 1701.13(E)4 contains
Ohio's indemnification provision. Paragraph (E)(4) of that section provides methods
for determining whether a party seeking indemnification meets applicable standards.
It goes on to state that this determination may be made by a majority vote of a quorum
of disinterested directors. If a quorum is not obtainable, or if a majority of the quorum
of disinterested directors so directs, the determination may be made "in a written
opinion by independent legal counsel other than an attorney, or a firm having associ-
ated with an attorney, who has been retained by, or who has performed services for
the corporation or any person to be indemnified within the last five years . . .- 5
We can back-door into a judicial sanction of investigations by counsel in con-
nection with the question of the board's role in stockholder derivative actions. Now,
Ohio is not Delaware with its plethora of law in this area. The only Ohio case that I
could find directly in point is a rather obscure Common Pleas Court case, Rice v.
Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co.6 In this case, the court decided that directors
not involved in the misconduct alleged, "acting under the advice of counsel," 7 may
properly refuse to bring a derivative action after a shareholder's request. If the
directors reach that conclusion, no derivative action will lie.8 Incidentally, I said this
case was obscure, but it is cited in the concurring opinion of the famous and definitive
case of Burks v. Lasker.9
From clues like this we may assume that internal corporate investigations by
4. Oiuo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1701.13(E) (Page 1978).
5. Id.
6. 71 Ohio L. Abs. 205, 130 N.E.2d 442 (C.P. 1954), order on appeal rev'd on other grounds, 163 Ohio St. 606,
128 N.E.2d 16 (1955).
7. Id. at 213, 130 N.E.2d at 448.
8. Id. at 214, 130 N.E.2d at 449.
9. 441 U.S. 471, 487 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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counsel have become a permanent fixture of the corporate culture both in Ohio and
the United States as a whole.
Prof. Shipman: Thank you very much, Stanley. I want to ask Marshall Cox a
question. We have been discussing the internal corporate investigation as a formal
affair that occurs infrequently. All of us know, of course, that there are all kinds of
ongoing legal compliance programs (securities and antitrust) and day-to-day in-
vestigations. When regular counsel (be it inside or outside) conducts, say, a legal
audit for antitrust problems or violations, are there dangers in eroding the trust and
confidence between counsel and client so that those being audited are less likely to
contact you with problems as they arise? All of us know that the best result for
everyone usually comes when the client phones the lawyer at the earliest sign of
trouble. Is the regular counsel in this hypothetical unwisely combining the roles of
advisor and investigator-enforcer? I'd also like Marshall to speak to the role of
Upjohn"° in the informal, low-key corporate investigation and the role of Upjohn
generally.
Mr. Cox: It seems to me that the point at which the conflict arises for either the
inside lawyer or the regular outside lawyer is when the usual relationship between
lawyer and client is put at risk. In conducting a routine antitrust audit to see how
things are going, you do not usually encounter that kind of risk. If, God forbid, you
find out that, say, the chief executive officer of your client has been meeting regularly
with his opposite number at his major competitor for improper purposes, you have to
face up to that problem. But you cannot go into every relationship you've got with
your client and expect to find that kind of highly unusual circumstance.
If the internal audit is not being conducted entirely by an inside lawyer (as in
many instances it is), an inside lawyer should be there when the outside lawyers are
carrying on whatever investigation they are. At least, it's been my experience that the
individuals whom one is likely to interview are going to know and look to the inside
lawyers, and you as an outside lawyer are going to have a great deal more credibility
if you are accompanied by someone they view as their lawyer. With that added
credibility, you can work yourself into a position where you become their lawyer. In
much the same way, it's certainly been my experience that the inside lawyer recog-
nizes the personalities within the company, the flow of papers, and other facts which
make it possible to move in relatively quickly and find out what's going on.
As I read Upjohn, most of the kind of information collecting that goes on in
these circumstances (whether it's by an inside lawyer or by an outside lawyer) ought
to be subject to the attorney-client privilege, and any notetaking or that kind of thing
ought also to be subject to a work product privilege. Upjohn has made the control
group concept irrelevant.
On the other hand, it is the corporation that is the client. To the extent that there
is a privilege, be it an attorney-client privilege or work product privilege, it belongs
to the corporation and normally does not cover the individuals. I feel it's important to
notify any individuals who are providing information that this is the fact. This is a
10. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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sort of Miranda1 warning. If I'm talking to an executive of a client, he should know
that I'm not representing him, that I'm representing the corporation, and that I believe
what he tells me is privileged as to the corporation but not necessarily as to him.
Along with that, again depending on the setting, if it's at least potentially criminal (as
it often is in the antitrust setting), I usually indicate that if he wishes to consult his
own counsel or counsel retained for him by the company, I think that's appropriate
too. In my experience, companies have usually benefited by having executives in-
dividually represented in circumstances where there may be some criminal risk.
Prof. Shipman: Marshall, thank you very much. We have been developing
material that leads to a major question: Is it proper and legal to represent both the
corporation and its directors, officers, and employees in an SEC investigation, a
formal corporate investigation, or in a criminal case? Though the Supreme Court of
the United States has gotten tougher and tougher on conflicts of interest, it has never
laid down a strict per se rule, and it has noted strong counter-considerations-joint
defenses save money and a joint defense may be more effective against a pros-
ecutor.12 I will ask Stan Sporkin to comment upon policy and practicality.
Mr. Sporkin: First of all, I have got to tell you that when I go, I want Art to give
my eulogy. Maybe that's what he was giving today.
As Mr. Cox indicated, the multiple representation problem presents a real di-
lemma for lawyers. Often lawyers represent more than one client in a proceeding.
They do not give the problem much consideration at the commencement of the
representation. They reason that if and when a conflict arises during the course of the
representation, they will pick and choose the client that they want to represent. Then
they will cut the other one adrift. They may, however, find when they want to cut
them adrift that it's too late. When lawyers obtain information that can be used
against that person or is detrimental to the other client that they represent, they find
themselves in a very difficult position. This event usually arises when they have two
clients and information they receive from one client conflicts with the representation
of the other. Instead of being able to pick and choose, and say "okay, client A, I'm
going to represent you; client B you're on the sidelines," what normally happens is
that the lawyers themselves are on the sidelines representing neither one. Both clients
get other lawyers.
Let me give you some real examples that I encountered at the SEC.
Case Number One: Corporate director and officer of a company goes to com-
pany counsel and explains to company counsel that he has made some illegal cam-
paign contributions on behalf of the corporation and he wants help in responding to
the SEC. The lawyer is in a difficult position, because if he undertakes the representa-
tion he realizes he's obtaining information from this client that is going to have an
impact on his representation of the corporation, which is really his main client. If this
problem doesn't present enough of a question, add to the hypothetical the factor that
the lawyer not only represents the corporation and the chief executive officer of the
11. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 389 (1966).
12. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
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corporation but he is also himself on the board of directors. Add to this problem the
fact that when the client is called to respond, he takes the fifth amendment. The
corporation now wants to find out what happened. It has to engage in its own
investigation. Directors are sitting around the board room. What does this lawyer/
director do? Does he remain quiet? Does he tell them yes, the chief executive officer
did it? This case involved a law firm in the United States and led to a rule put in by
that law firm that the firm would represent only the one client, as Mr. Cox said, and
that members of the firm would not sit on any more boards of directors of clients.
They feel that they have a potential or actual conflict when their members sit on a
client's board.
Case Number Two: The lawyer represented both the chief executive officer and
the corporation. There was a major question as to where a substantial amount of
corporate funds went, and the lawyer came to see me. This is after the individual
client had taken the fifth amendment.
Obviously, the corporation can't take the fifth amendment, although it would
have liked to take the fifth amendment and tried to do so! The lawyer said, "Stan,
don't worry." I said, "I'm not worried, you have got the problem." He said, "You
know, you like all these cases where you get special counsel, don't you?" I said,
"When they're advisable, we try to get that." He said, "You're not going to have to
worry in this case because I'm going to give you one." He said, "We'll agree to
having a special counsel appointed to find where the money is." I was a little cruel,
but I told him that while I usually would accept this arrangement, I was bothered by
the expense to the corporation when you, Mr. Lawyer, can find out so easily where
the money went by just simply asking your individual client. I concluded that it
would be unfair to the corporation to saddle it with the expense, and we did not settle
that case. Thus, here is a case where if the lawyer had been representing only the
company, there would probably have been a suitable settlement, but because he was
also representing the individual client, I did not think the proposal appropriate,
particularly in view of the fact that it would have been such an easy thing for the
client to supply that information. This is a case where the company, I must tell you,
got a thorough housecleaning. We cleaned out the whole works. The company
needed and required it. However, as is true in most cases, the grand experiment
worked. An extremely able person was brought in to take over control of the corpora-
tion and brought it back from death into life and it has done quite well.
Case Number Three: Here's what happens if a lawyer decides to represent not
only a broker-dealer firm but also the registered representatives who are accused of
the specific wrongdoing. Here you have a number of cases that fit this mold. In one
case, I think the law firm represented not only the company but also a large number of
the registered representatives. This presents extraordinarily difficult problems. First,
the lawyer for the company has a responsibility and a duty to recommend the firing of
dishonest employees. Similarly, if you're representing the individual registered
representative, you may well want to put in a defense that the-devil-made-me-do-it-
that I was under tremendous pressure from my employer who told me that I wasn't
making the quotas. Therefore, I had to reach a little more and become more aggres-
sive. Now, what you're doing when you're in the so-called joint defense that Pro-
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fessor Shipman mentioned is to narrow your case to defenses that both your clients
can meet. In so doing, you have narrowed the field in which you can defend the case.
But a defense lawyer wants the broadest playing field that he or she can have. In
addition to the obvious ethical questions, I can assure you that you'll get into the
problems that I'm talking about when you try to settle the case. Look at the problems.
Whom are you going to prefer in the settlement? Are you going to try to get the
corporate clients off? That client is paying your fee and paying the fees for all these
other people. Is that going to be your primary responsibility? Are you going to toss
away the individuals? Are you going to say, "I've got a good deal for you? You
know, I'll give you all these representatives in a package-bar them forever and let
the company go?" How are you going to do that? It's incredible. Many of you are
going to say that Sporkin is overstating the case. I can assure you the fact is that these
problems arise every day. These conflict of interest problems seem insoluble. Mr.
Cox took my thunder by stating the simple solution to the problem. Maybe he can
afford to do it because he works for a very impressive law firm, but I do think that his
solution is the answer: namely, at the earliest possible time, identify your client. Be
sure that the client knows that and that everybody else knows whom you're not
representing. Remember, if it's a person's reasonable perception that you represent
him or her, I think the courts will say that you have an attorney-client relationship and
that information the person gave you is confidential information that you can not use
against him or her. As Mr. Cox said, at the beginning state that "I do not represent
you; I represent the company; if you tell me that you have done something wrong, I
must report it to my client and perhaps recommend to my client that it take action
against you; and if you would feel more comfortable in talking to your lawyer before
you talk to me, I would encourage you to do so." Some lawyers have a brief written
statement that they'll give a person so that the record is clear. If this care is not taken,
the individual may later assert a successful malpractice claim against the lawyer on
the grounds that an attorney-client relationship existed and the "client's" interests
were not protected. So when you're in this one-on-one situation with the individual,
it's extremely important to document your conversation.
Mr. Cox, do you do that by any kind of a piece of paper or do you make a
memorandum?
Mr. Cox: We usually have had a memo. Typically, I have an associate with me
and he or she does the memo.
Mr. Sporkin: The point is that it's important that you limit your representation at
the beginning. If you go beyond the beginning moment, your choices have become
narrowed and very limited because once you get that little bit of information from the
"client," it may well be too late later on to proceed against that person unless you've
first done what Mr. Cox and I have indicated. Thank you.
Prof. Shipman: Thank you very much, Stan. I should now like to ask Paul
Gonson, who is a recognized expert on, inter alia, the professional responsibility
duties and liabilities of securities lawyers, to comment on these conflict of interest
issues.
Mr. Gonson: Thanks, Morgan. It is my lot in life to follow Stanley Sporkin, who
gives the great war stories, and I give the section numbers.
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A number of years ago a law professor at Yale, Geoffrey Hazard, wrote a very
interesting little book called Ethics in the Practice of Law. 13 He noted that we lawyers
tend to identify the universe of persons in two categories: clients and non-clients. He
suggests that there is a third category he calls quasi-clients. These are persons who
have certain expectations as to what relationships they might have with a lawyer, and
I think these are the kind of persons that Stanley has been talking about and Marshall
Cox has also mentioned. These are the employees or the other persons you're talking
to when you as a lawyer are making an investigation. The Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility of the American Bar Association, which has been adopted in
almost all the states, isn't very helpful on the question of who is the client. Ethical
Consideration 5-18 expresses the so-called entity theory. 14 The client is the corpora-
tion and not any of its stockholders, officers, directors, employees, or so on.
For several years an ABA group has been working toward revision of that Code,
and in August 1983 the American Bar Association adopted a new model code, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 15 Of course, the Model Rules do not become
effective until they are adopted by individual states. The Model Rules are now being
considered by several states. Last February, at the ABA's New Orleans meeting,
there was a proposed revision to the concept of who is a client, and then-proposed
Rule 1.13(a) stated that a lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents
the organization, including its directors, officers, employees, members, sharehold-
ers, or other constituents as a group, except where the interests of any one or more of
the group may be adverse to the organization's interests. That caused a big hullaba-
loo. Nobody could figure out what that meant. This August, when the ABA finally
adopted the entire Model Rules, they changed that. Rule 1.13, as finally adopted,
now reads that a lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents. What does "con-
stituents" mean? The commentary says that officers, directors, employees, and
shareholders are constituents, but then it goes on to say that if an organizational client
requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the
course of that investigation between the lawyer and the corporate client's employees
or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. That rule provides that the lawyer may
not reveal information relating to representation of a client except under severely
limited circumstances. This all means that constituents of an organizational client are
not also the clients of the lawyer and the lawyer cannot disclose to those constituents
information that he or she receives from other constituents. Model Rule 1.13(e) says
that a lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders, or other constituents, subject to Model
Rule 1.7, which is the conflict of interest rule. In other words, it says yes, pro-
fessional ethics will permit a lawyer to represent multiple defendants, provided that
there is no conflict of interest. Stan has identified areas where there may be a conflict
of interest.
13. G. HAZARD, Emnics IN THE PRAcncF OF LAW (1978).
14. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1980).
15. MODEL RUaES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
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Rule 2.3 speaks to who retains the lawyer and where the lawyer's duties run. If
the lawyer is retained by the corporation, all duties of loyalty run to that corporation.
If a lawyer is retained by a court, for example, pursuant to its order for a special
investigation leading to a report to the court, then those loyalties do not run to the
corporation but rather they run to the court or possibly even to the SEC representing
the public interest in a larger way.
Rule 4.3 covers dealing with unrepresented persons. That rule suggests that if a
lawyer is dealing with someone who is unrepresented, the lawyer must explain what
is necessary to avoid being misleading to that person.
From all this, I tentatively conclude that where the lawyer who represents the
corporation seeks to interview employees and officials of that company in an in-
vestigation and those persons are not represented by counsel, the lawyer probably
does have to give the Miranda/Cox kind of warning. Keep in mind that from a
practical standpoint, the employee is almost required to cooperate, because the
lawyer will usually have with her or him a letter from the Chairman of the Board or
some other high corporate official directing all employees to cooperate with the
lawyer.
Morgan and Stanley Sporkin also asked whether the warning should be written.
John Fedders, who has written a number of articles on corporate investigations,
recommends the use of a form letter and also published the form of a letter used by
him in an investigation.
16
There are a great many articles that are cited in footnotes to Art's excellent
paper. A very good one is not there, an article written by Kathleen Gallagher 17
dealing with the situation post-Upjohn.' 8 In Upjohn, the United States Supreme
Court held that the corporation's attorney-client privilege will cover interviews by the
corporate lawyer even with low level employees. Gallagher's article examines the
question of what happens to the low level employee who has given information to the
lawyer if the corporation decides for one reason or another to waive its privilege.
Does that low level employee have any privilege? The answer seems to be no. There
is no attorney-client relationship between the low level employee (or even the high
level employee) and the investigating lawyer. So, Gallagher concludes, the employee
is then left, in her words, "naked." 9 If the corporation wants to sacrifice up some of
its people, then there's no attorney-client protection that that employee has. Gal-
lagher recommends a system of warnings. She also suggests a modification of the
privilege that would cover that person in some circumstances and makes other recom-
mendations which she thinks would cause equity in the circumstances.
Prof. Shipman: Paul, I think the old E.F. Hutton case20 from the Southern
District of Texas should be mentioned as a relevant caveat to what you say. What you
16. Fedders, Corporate Criminal Responsibility-Conducting an Internal Corporate Investigation, 3 CRsm. DEF.
Tss. (MB) § 62.06[4] & n.33 (1979).
17. Gallagher, Legal and Professional Responsibility of Corporate Counsel to Employees During an Internal
Investigation for Corporate Misconduct, 6 CORP. L. REv. 3 (1983).
18. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
19. Gallagher, supra note 17, at 6.
20. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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say is absolutely right if you follow the CoxlMiranda procedure. If, however, that
careful procedure is not followed and the employee reasonably believes that he is
being represented along with the company, I would think the lawyer for the company
probably also has the employee for a client and the employee (though not the lawyer
necessarily) is fully clothed.2 1
Mr. Gonson: E.F. Hutton did hold that. An employee of E.F. Hutton was
represented by Hutton's lawyers and reasonably thought the lawyer was representing
him.
Let me indicate that Art is right in saying that in some circumstances, it's
advantageous for the lawyer to represent both the corporation and several employees
specifically to preserve the privilege if-and this is a major if-there is no conflict of
interest or significant possibility of such a conflict developing.
Two other points and I shall conclude. First, something should be done about the
waiver problem. It would be a splendid idea from the point of view of corporate
governance principles generally if a corporation could investigate itself in good faith
and then be able to go to the government (to the SEC or IRS, for example) and say:
"We made an investigation and wish to reveal to you what we have found. We're
willing to correct whatever we have to correct and make whatever amends we have to
do." A corporation should be able to do that without waiving its confidentiality. At
present, on these facts, grand juries and class action plaintiffs in many circuits can get
the results of the investigation. In Diversified Industries,22 discussed in Art's paper,
confidentiality was given, but subsequent cases in other circuits (also discussed by
Art)23 have held, on similar facts, that if you give the results of the information to the
government to show that you have cleaned up your act, you have waived for all time
and all purposes. These harmful new developments also seem contrary to Sells
Engineering,24 which held that Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that United States Attorneys presenting information to grand juries may not,
generally speaking, give that information to civil attorneys in the federal government,
even though the federal government may clearly have civil remedies in court. The
situation today is thus quite odd and harmful: information developed in the grand jury
investigation cannot, generally speaking, be turned over to the civil attorneys in
government, but information generated voluntarily by a private corporation and
turned over to the civil side of government can easily become available to the grand
jury and everyone else. Legislative or other corrective action is needed to protect the
usefulness of internal corporate investigations.
Second, the business judgment rule we discussed with reference to directors25
should, in my opinion, be applied to lawyers who make internal corporate in-
vestigations. These lawyers make very difficult judgments. They ought not to be
21. However, a corporate officer seeking a personal attorney-client privilege for consultation with the corporation's
counsel has a heavy burden. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich. 1977), affd per
curiam, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978).
22. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
23. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 655, 668-69 (1984).
24. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 3133 (1983).
25. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
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judged with hindsight, for with somebody's demanding hindsight an actor is often
wrong.
Prof. Shipman: Thank you, Paul. We have worked our way to some pivotal
questions. We talked about confidentiality of reports. We talked about discretion of
directors, the exercise of business judgment. We talked about the termination of
derivative suits as the most controversial exercise of that discretion. This sends us
into two cases, both decided in the State of New York, one by the New York Court of
Appeals a number of years ago, the Auerbach26 decision, and Joy v. North,27 a recent
Second Circuit diversity case ostensibly based on Connecticut law. Joy v. North
orders the trial court, in at least some cases, to use its business judgment in reviewing
a decision by a committee of independent directors of a corporation to recommend
termination of derivative actions, and holds that the committee's filings with the court
(which may contain a normally-privileged investigative report by special counsel) in
support of the motion usually may not be kept under seal.
I want to ask Stu Summit, an ace litigator, his opinion of the effect of Joy v.
North (and the Delaware decision on which it was partially based) upon the utility of
having special counsel conduct an investigation and using counsel's report as a basis
for the action of the board or a special committee of independent directors moving to
dismiss a derivative suit. If the whole report becomes public and non-privileged, is
the game worth the candle?
Mr. Summit: From a practical point of view, Joy v. North and the Delaware
Maldonado28 decision have the same effect, although their holdings and rationales
differ somewhat.
Under these decisions, if you wish to rely on disinterested directors' determina-
tion that the particular derivative action then pending before a court should be dis-
missed because continuation of the action is not in the corporate interest, you must
prove to some extent (not yet defined) that the determination itself was disinterested,
was the result of full information in the possession of those disinterested persons who
made it, and that the judgment is in fact correct. These two courts don't use the word
"correct"-they take the high road and profess not to be second guessing directors-
but the fact is that the moment you get trial lawyers in the courtroom whose goal is to
have the court agree with a position or disagree with it, correctness becomes the
issue, however the semantics are couched. That is, the court can say, "all I want to
do is make sure that it is reasonable," but the lawyers are not going to merely set out
to prove it's reasonable. The lawyers are going to set out to prove if it's right or
wrong, because that's what we're trained to do. We're going to come in with every-
thing we can, assuming the lawsuit is important. These two cases change the rules of
the game. If you choose to rely on such an investigation and a decision by directors
not involved in the alleged wrongs, you're going to have a trial, or at least a fact-
finding decision of some sort, on whether or not the decision made by those in-
26. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); see Mathews, Internal
Corporate Investigations, 45 OIO ST. L.J. 655, part VII at 673-78 (1984).
27. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
28. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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dependent directors was sound, by one test or another. In the case of the Delaware
court, they were quite clear that the judge is supposed to exercise his business
judgment, which is in stark contrast with the classic rule of Auerbach,29 where the
New York Court of Appeals held that directors not affected by the litigation or
transactions could, by following the proper procedure, make a business judgment
decision with a finality that would not be reviewed on the merits by a court.
As a practical matter, these issues do not come up in baseless cases. If they do,
somebody in my judgment is wasting a lot of time. It's really awfully elaborate to go
about an internal investigation, which often creates its own problems. Plaintiff sues
everybody, including otherwise disinterested directors. So right away, by the
mechanistic rules that we use, directors are automatically alleged to be not dis-
interested even if they weren't really involved in the transaction at issue. You,
therefore, have to go to a lot of trouble to get one of these disinterested director
decisions. You have to take the high road. You don't use internal counsel. You don't
use regular counsel. You use new counsel, who have to learn the names of the players
and what the addresses are and the like. All this trouble to do what? To then try to
prove to a judge that the disinterested directors were right. You're not going to do that
for a baseless case, in my judgment. It's just as easy to prove the case is baseless and
be done with it.
Where the question arises is in other kinds of cases, those that arguably have
merit to them. A violation of law may have occurred, or maybe there is no argument
about it: the facts will ultimately demonstrate that a violation of law has occurred.
Now, remember, we're talking about derivative actions, and that's a special breed of
case because they purport to be in the name of and for the benefit of the corporation.
The business judgment issue in those cases-and it is a question of policy and
judgment-is whether the present value of the possible judgment in favor of the
corporation (discounted by time value of money, risks of failure or non-collection)
exceeds the detrimental costs to the corporation in continuing the case. That is a value
judgment. In my opinion, it cannot be quantified as Joy v. North suggests. If it looks
like the corporation might recover $2,000,000 and the case is only going to cost
$300,000 to try, well that initially appears to be a terrific bargain. If, however, you
continue the litigation, the harm to the company and its current business may exceed
$2,000,000 by reason of matters unrelated to the transaction in the lawsuit. Now,
who can scientifically determine that? Well, we now know for sure that in the Second
Circuit (under Connecticut or other law not clearly to the contrary) or in Delaware,
it's the judges who will make such a determination. Why should they? They're not
business people. They may have no way of appraising these intangibles, but there we
are. I personally cannot envision the circumstance where I would recommend, under
a Joy v. North rule of law, doing the internal investigation, having the disinterested
directors make a business judgment, and then litigating about the correctness of the
judgment. The baseless case can be handled on its substantive merits. In other cases,
if you conduct an internal investigation and try to use it to back up a decision by
29. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
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disinterested directors to terminate the litigation, you have only aided the plaintiffs.
According to the Second Circuit, if you wish to rely on the report to try to dismiss the
case, you must put the report forward with all supporting data and justify it with
everything you can. After all that trouble and aid to the plaintiff, you then run the risk
of having the court disagree with the recommendation of the report. How can you ask
a judicial officer, whose whole being is directed toward curing violations of law and
imposing retribution for violations of law, to approve a pragmatic decision to forego
retribution for a violation of law as a sound result on the merits? Once judicial review
goes beyond verifying the procedures used and testing the disinterestedness of direct-
ors, the result is most dicey.
But despite the problems Paul Gonson has mentioned and despite the problems
of a Joy v. North rule, there will be times when an internal corporate investigation is
clearly indicated. One of the reasons is because of the differing interests within the
corporate constituency. We've talked of the corporation as if it were a single person.
Typically, the reason internal corporate investigations take place, and should take
place, is because there is a very great difference of interest between independent and
other directors. Notwithstanding some of the academic skepticism of independent
directors expressed this morning, we all have seen that when trouble starts or looks
like it might, the independent directors (either through self-interest or simply being
good people) do take the reins and do insist on finding out what the story is. And all
of the problems aside, if an independent director wants to know what's happened
over a period of time in a complicated fact picture, the internal corporate investiga-
tion is the way to go about it. Assuming an internal investigation is to be had, one of
the major problems that has led to untoward consequences, in my judgment, is not
having decided, early-in the game, on a clear purpose for the corporate investigation
or not sticking with that purpose. Typically, some people will decide at the beginning
of an investigation that they do not want the result to be publicly available. They
don't want to have to hand it over to SEC Enforcement. They don't want to publish
the report. So they take every feasible step to ground the investigation in one or more
privileges. And when you set out to do that, the odds are pretty good, if you do it
right, of retaining the privilege. For example, instead of worrying about the in-
terviewee being protected by a privilege, you give it to her: you have her counsel
there; you say that everyone knows we're going to get sued about all this, but not to
worry about conflict of interest because each of us has separate lawyers present; and
you point to the joint defense privilege, which is recognized when there are two or
more lawyers and two or more clients, all of whom could face litigation. So there are
ways of going far to protect some kind of privilege. There are even ways of dealing
with the auditors on the subject without delivering the report that has been prepared.
Where the special counsel has to get involved with the audit and has to sign off on the
audit, special counsel may sign off without delivering any specific information.
Prof. Shipman: How's that done, Stu? That is a very practical point.
Mr. Summit: In the one case I can mention, this was done: We sat in the room
with the auditors and we went through, line by line, questions they had asked us. This
was a highly sensitive situation; the company was obviously heading toward bank-
ruptcy in the near future (which in fact came to pass), and the auditors raised sensitive
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issues with us. We (speaking very generally) asked them if they had looked at certain
areas. "Did you talk to so-and-so about such and such?" Without giving away the
sensitive nature of a precise topic, we just kept talking. Both sides were very tentative
and careful until both were satisfied that a thorough job had been done by the
auditors. Even so, there was a notation by the auditors that the investigation was
underway but it wasn't taken as an exception to the opinion.
Prof. Shipman: O.K. And you don't think there was a waiver? The auditors did
note it in the footnotes?
Mr. Summit: Well, it was couched in a way that did not disclose our participa-
tion and no substantive information was conveyed to them. We recognized we were
on difficult ground, and that someone might challenge the conclusion that the priv-
ilege was not waived, but we felt that we had to do what we did. We had to have the
investigation going on on the one hand, and they had to get an audit out on the other.
To return to my major point, what you do not dare do, once you have decided to
have a fully privileged investigation, is to change horses, because then you may have
created at least a claim of privilege for interviewees. It's damn difficult to then
decide, "All right, we're just voluntarily going to turn the report over lock, stock and
barrel." A truly involuntary turnover is another matter, but I think some of the
problems have come from people setting out down a privileged road and then ul-
timately realizing that they are in so much trouble that they had better go the other
way and disgorge the information, leaving a very confused situation.
In any event, I think there are instances where internal corporate investigations
are desirable, and with good attention to what you're doing and why, they can
sometimes serve a useful result, at least for the uninvolved directors.
Prof. Shipman: Thank you very much. I did want someone who litigated a lot to
speak. We've got to remember that many of these questions are tied into litigation.
Let's now focus on sensitive transactions. Suppose you as an independent coun-
sel conduct an investigation and find that certain sensitive transactions have taken
place; they are rather old and cold, and they are not material financially. I want to ask
Art Mathews and the panel what the SEC CitiCorp Release 30 means in that context. Is
the old doctrine-anything that touched on integrity of management was per se
material-relegated to the history books?
Mr. Mathews: Let me not answer it just in the context of CitiCorp. Also, let me
first comment on what Stu said. I agree with Stu on the efficacy of having in-
terviewees represented by counsel and then having a joint defense privilege. I also
might say that it often may be appropriate that the corporation pay the counsel fees for
employees and officers, subject to whatever the state indemnification statutes and the
corporate charter and bylaws provide. But one problem that you have to flag on the
joint defense doctrine is that in most cirumstances either client can waive the priv-
ilege over the objection of the other. So don't go into a joint defense doctrine
situation and think you've got guaranteed privilege, for whenever the two clients get
at odds with each other, either client can waive.
30. SEC CitiCorp Release, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 82-19 (Mar. 5, 1982), discussed in Mathews, Corpo-
rate Internal Investigations, 45 OmIo ST. L.J. 655, 698-99 (1984).
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Mr. Summit: Actually, most cases agree with Art, but there are a few that go the
totally opposite way-that neither client can disclose without the consent of the
other, but both rules pose the equivalent practical problem, that is, you'd damn well
better know what you're doing when you get into it.
I don't want to be misunderstood. I would never claim, and never have claimed,
that the information a witness or party has is subject to a privilege that a lawyer for
someone else controls. It is that the particular communication of the information that
(depending on which way the cases go and what each party wants to do) may be
subject to the joint defense privilege. What the person witnessed and was part of
some years before is never itself subject to that privilege. Sometimes that aspect of
the joint defense privilege gets misinterpreted by people.
Mr. Mathews: Let me, if I may, answer Morgan's question on how you de-
termine whether you have to disclose what you found. I think that the CitiCorp
Release, which is summarized in my paper, is probably of no help at all. I think it
ought not to be relied on. I think that that was one of those cases that was stale and
was a hot potato within the agency, and I don't think the release actually stands for
anything. When you have to go for guidance (and it's not definitive guidance, but it
gives direction), go to John Fedders' speech that he gave to the ABA in November,
1982.31 He took a substantial step back from some of the things that I think Stanley
was pushing (when Stanley was running the enforcement program) in the areas of
"integrity theories" of materiality for disclosure purposes. According to Fedders,
there are four areas in which something may be material. One is the traditional
quantitative financial materiality. That has been traditional for fifty years. Two is
self-dealing; even if it's not quantitatively material, if the managers are dipping into
the cookie jar and getting kickbacks or the like, self-dealing has to be disclosed.
Three, if there is a particular SEC form that requires an item response-either under
the proxy rules, 8-K's, 10-K's, 10-Q's, or anything else-if the Commission has
asked for a particular line item disclosure, you must respond and disclose even
though it's not financially material. Four, a false statement in filings is material.
When you do say something in a filing, it's got to be correct and you cannot fail to
disclose something that would make whatever you said merely a half-truth. But the
important thing is (and this is the step back from where the law was at least in the
enforcement context, I believe, when Stanley left the Commission) that Fedders said
that unadjudicated misconduct that does not rise to the level of any of these four
points for judging materality is not material. The present Shad-Fedders SEC is taking
the viewpoint that they will not require mere unadjudicated conduct (aside from
self-dealing) to be disclosed on an integrity of management, integrity of earnings, or
integrity of assets theory. And somewhat along that line, Commissioner Bevis Long-
streth has written a recent Business Lawyer article.32 If you combine the Longstreth
Business Lawyer article and the Fedders speech, you get some guidance. However,
the Fedders speech is only an enforcement policy speech as to whom the SEC is going
31. Speech by John Fedders on Failure to Disclose Illegal Conduct, 14 SEc. REi. & L. REP. (BNA) 2057 (Nov. 26,
1982).
32. Longstreth, SEC Disclosure Policy Regarding Management Integrity, 38 Bus. LAw. 1413 (1983).
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to sue. It does not bind a prosecutor or a judge. I'd be interested, Stanley, if you'd
have any comment on the fifth element in the Fedders speech, that for unadjudicated
violations that don't trigger the first four concepts, the SEC won't bring enforcement
actions.
Mr. Sporkin: Well, now that I'm on the other side, I'll take all the crumbs that I
can get. But I think the Fedders language is a little too sweeping. If you literally state
that an unadjudicated violation is not required to be disclosed, in many instances the
SEC will be put out of business. It can't sit around and wait four years until some-
thing is adjudicated. Mr. Schwartz mentioned that one of his clients came in and said
he had all of these financial disclosure problems. Well, are you going to wait until it
becomes adjudicated before you disclose it? Under the securities laws, the corporate
issuer has a responsibility to make disclosures. The issuer knows the facts. It knows
whether they have assets or they don't have assets. It knows whether there's been a
defalcation or there hasn't been a defalcation. And I don't think I can take much
comfort if I'm going to be advising a client on a disclosure problem to say, "Well,
wait a second; how do we know we must disclose? No court has determined whether
it's required and no court has determined whether the financial statements are out of
whack." I don't think the Fedders language is realistic. I regret that I must disagree
with the Fedders statement if it's meant to be literal, but I don't think it washes.
Prof. Shipman: Stanley Sporkin, a question for you. On the initial investigation,
does the attorney have the duty to opine at the end of her or his investigation
concerning whether the corrective SEC-IRS filings have to be made? This is a hot
potato. You've investigated and established the facts. Is it your duty at that point to
say in your opinion that no corrective SEC filings are needed? Or the opposite, if the
opposite is true?
Mr. Sporkin: That, of course, Morgan, is very difficult to answer in isolation.
Obviously, you want to know what is the retainer arrangement? What were you asked
to do? Were you asked to go in and find the facts and to report back the facts and then
Mr. Schwartz was going to take over from there as counsel for the company? Then I
think your obligations may be a little less broad than they would be otherwise. Now
suppose that your retainer isn't so limited. Part of the retainer was to recommend a
course of action. You come in at the end and you say the recommendation we make is
that you revise your 10-K. Assume that you get to a high level in the corporation and
assume that they don't want to accede to your advice. I would not say that you would
have an obligation to go to the SEC or the authorities. 33 If, however, you are then
retained a month or two later to help prepare a registration statement, then of course
you would have a responsibility of making sure there had been full disclosure. It's a
difficult thing, Morgan, and I don't know if anybody else has any thoughts.
Prof. Shipman: I agree with everything you've said, Stanley. I think the one
thing I want to flag is one part of the In re John Doe opinion34 where the court, in
finding a prima facie case of cover-up and conspiracy, found that the lawyer wrote
33. See, e.g., In re Carter and Johnson, Exchange Act Release 17597, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 (1981).
34. In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982), discussed in Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations,
45 Ono ST. L.J. 655, 680-92 (1984).
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the report, covered everything he investigated, and called it the way he saw it except
for the one crucial item that didn't show up in the final copy of the report. The court
continued by saying that the client used the report to its advantage by showing it to
the underwriter and to the auditor and the fact that the client gave it to somebody else
and had them rely on it connoted that it was an entire job. So I guess what I come
back to, Stanley, is that it may well be that if only some things are disclosed in the
report and if the corporation tries to use the report to its advantage for only the things
that were disclosed, the lawyer and the company are going to be in trouble.
Mr. Summit: In which case, you dam well better say what's happened. Which
can be done. You can have a section saying we investigated claims involving thus and
so (no names, no dates, no nothing) and that because we were unable to unearth
evidence sufficient to justify mentioning them in this report, they are omitted. We
could spend the whole day on how to write the report. What was done by the lawyer
in In re John Doe was a terribly dangerous thing to do.
Mr. Gonson: Stu, there's a difficulty with that too. The Sealed Case opinion35
that Art has referred to a number of times is interesting, because there the grand jury
was not looking into, as I understand it, alleged substantive violations. It was looking
into what are essentially alleged obstruction of justice violations. The report that was
filed there said that the lawyers were aware of a $400,000 payment to a Mr. X and
could not find sufficient evidentiary basis to understand why it was made. And then
the prosecutor shows up with an affidavit from Mr. X, saying, "Well, I paid the
money... and the chairman was with me when I did it." The chairman had said
that he didn't know of any attempted bribes overseas. And so the D.C. Circuit held
that the prosecutor had shown a sufficient prima facie justification to get that report,
because the report fudged and didn't show what the payment was about and because
there was some evidence to indicate that in fact there may have been a crime. But the
fascination to me still is that, at least as articulated in the opinion, what the grand jury
was looking into was not the substantive violation but rather the alleged obstruction
of justice aspect of it.
Mr. Mathews: Paul, the other thing that the court relied upon was that the special
counsel never tried to interview X and did not disclose that fact. The report said that
they couldn't prove that it was an illegal payment, but they never said that they didn't
interview the one person who allegedly would have told them it was an illegal
payment.
Mr. Gonson: I wish to comment on Morgan's question whether the lawyer
should opine on legally required remedial steps. The three-judge panel in Diversified
Industries36 held that the attorney-client privilege would not apply to the investigation
there conducted because the lawyers were not engaging in legal activity: they were
merely factfinders, and anybody can investigate. The en banc opinion in Diversified
Industries37 disagreed with that. They said that the skills of a lawyer are brought to a
35. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982), discussed in Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45
OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 692-98 (1984).
36. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1977) (en
banc).
37. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
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factual investigation. However, it then became standard practice for the lawyer who
makes the investigation to give legal advice because it adds to the aura, if you will, of
lawyers' work. And so, lawyers customarily do give legal advice. The Fedders article
draws the line between legal advice and business advice. And sometimes that shades
pretty much. In the SEC area we talk about materiality-that's really legal advice, I
guess; but in some other areas of the law (antitrust, food and drug, pollution) you
shade into business judgments and every lawyer should be awfully careful not to
cross that line and give business advice rather than legal advice.
Mr. Mathews: Morgan, may I make one comment? I have recently been in-
volved in reading all of the cases on the attorney-client and work product privilege in
internal investigations, not only for this paper, but also for a separate paper on those
specific issues.3 8 I'm not a hundred percent sure where I am coming out, but I'm
almost sure that, based on reading all the cases mentioned in my paper delivered here,
that it's impossible in my tough case to preserve the confidentiality of the in-
vestigative work product by either the attorney-client privilege or the work product
privilege, and it's too great a risk. And I think where I'm coming out is that at
present, I don't think there will ever be any way to have one hundred percent
assurance that you can protect the investigative work product. By legislation or by ad
hoc judicial development, an internal investigation self-evaluative privilege 39 may be
developed along the lines Paul advocated, but that would be apart from the attorney-
client and work product privileges.
Prof. Buxbaum:4° I perceive a shift in focus over time. The internal corporate
investigation originally resulted from a deal with the SEC wherein the special counsel
was, directly or indirectly, doing the SEC's job of a public housecleaning. Now, the
focus seems to be upon an internal corporate investigation to avoid governmental
scrutiny or a derivative action-to avoid, if you will, public housecleaning. Has such
a shift happened and is it healthy?
Mr. Summit: You're quite right, to the extent to which you are addressing that
question to some points I made. Your points are entirely correct and I tried to be clear
about that at the time. If you set out to do a confidential investigation for the benefit
of the board and/or the independent directors in their conduct of the business affairs
of the company (who should stay, who should go, what lawsuits they may have, or
the like) and the report is clothed that way, you can't reasonably expect to forestall
the SEC or anybody else. You are not doing their job and you are not helping them
specifically.
Prof. Shipman: What about where you contract with the SEC? Does the nature
of that change?
Mr. Summit: I don't think so. No. And the in between is where you are conduct-
ing the investigation. You know the SEC will want you to do it (hoping you have
38. See Crisman and Mathews, Limited Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine In Internal
Corporate Investigations: An Emerging Corporate "Self-Evaluative" Privilege, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 123 (1983).
39. See, e.g., Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege, The Self-Evaluative Report Privilege, and Diversified
Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 699 (1979) and other authorities cited in Mathews, Internal Corporate
Investigations, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 655, 669 nn. 76-77 (1984).
40. Richard M. Buxbaum, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
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done it well); and you take the report to them, hoping that with their limited re-
sources, the SEC will say the report will do, even if it is not exactly what the SEC
would have done.
Mr. Mathews: The problem arises because most of the circuits have rejected the
limited waiver of privilege theory. 41 Thus, the company can't do the investigation
and share it with the SEC the way they're usually willing to do if there were a
universal limited waiver rule. As it is, when the company shares the report with the
SEC, the company risks giving the report to its adversary in class and derivative
actions. And the lack of any general self-evaluative privilege has aggravated that
problem. That's the dilemma.
If anyone thinks that they're going to do a less than adequate investigation, just
review the Textron42 case. An inadequate, quick investigation can cause more prob-
lems than it cures.
Mr. Gonson: This is a corporate governance program. It's interesting to see the
parallel development between internal corporate investigations and peer review in the
accounting profession. In the early 1970's, sort of in tandem with the development of
the internal investigations by corporate America, the SEC was bringing a fairly large
number of disciplinary proceedings against large accounting firms. In the past, the
SEC had invoked discipline such as suspension upon individual accountants, or in
some cases, firms for a limited period of time. It shifted gears dramatically in the
early 1970's and entered into settlements whereby the accountants would in effect
investigate themselves-try to clean up their act and try to identify the kinds of
practices that got them into difficulty with the Commission. That became known as
peer review, because the way that was done was accounting firm A would hire
accounting firm B to review its practices and procedures. Eventually, that became
institutionalized. The AICPA restructured itself and set up a public company group.
Peer review is now a recognized institution in major accounting firm practices. And
that I think, is an interesting illustration of how informal ad hoc practices become
institutions.
Prof. Shipman: Any other questions from the audience? Hearing no questions, I
want to thank all of you very much for attending, and I declare the Conference over,
one minute early.
41. See Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 669 (1984); see also Crisman &
Mathews, Limited Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine in Internal Corporate Investigations:
An Emerging Corporate "Self-Evaluative" Privilege, 21 AM. CRAM. L. REv. 123 (1983).
42. See Textron Settles SEC Antifraud, Reporting Charges Based on Foreign, Domestic Questionable Payments,
[Jan.-June] SeC. R o. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 539, at A-2 (Feb. 6, 1980).
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